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For decades several studies have been trying to find the source of ‘intention’ in the 
brain. Historically, we have two landmark studies.The first one, by Kornhuber and Deecke 
(1965) lead to the discovery of the readiness potential (BP), a slow buildup of neural 
activity preceding un-cued, “self-initiated” movements, whose location was identified in the 
preSMA and SMA areas of the brain. This buildup has been observed using both invasive 
and non- invasive neural recordings and in both vertebrate and invertebrate species.  
Around 20 years later, the experiment by Benjamin Libet (1983), showed a lag between 
the subjective time of the urge or intention to move and the neural decision to act 
represented by this electrophysiological signal of movement preparation, opening up a still 
running debate concerning the unawareness of neuronal mechanisms underlying free 
choices. In this panorama, the research on self-initiated action has so far proceeded under 
the assumption that this buildup reflects the beginning of a causal process of “planning 
and preparation for movement”.  
Recent developments in the field seriously challenge this assumption and have opened the 
door to a paradigm shift in this area of research. We will review the modern history of 
research on self-initiated movement and volition with a focus on these recent 
developments, suggesting how the introduction of formal computational models 
(accumulator or bounded-integrator models) for the study of volition is playing a major role 
in this change of perspective.
Abstract
Self-initiated movements 
Actions/movements are self-initiated/generated ‘if not uniquely specified by external cues', 
as opposed to externally triggered movements/actions. Pressing on the brake pedal 
when the traffic light ahead turns red is an example of an action initiated in response to a 
sensory cue. Deciding whether and when to kick a football, instead, leads to one of those 
actions that from a third-person perspective appear to be both voluntary and 
spontaneous, and are commonly referred to as ‘self-initiated’. 
For an extensive review on the topic and the debate around the definition of self-generated 
actions see Schüür & Haggard 2011 
Neural decision to move  
A neural event or state that commits the motor system to the initiation of an imminent 
movement in a specific moment. As Schurger et al. 2016 points out, “it is not necessary 
for this state to be conscious for it to qualify as a ‘decision’”. 
Integration-to-bound or evidence accumulator models

 
A class of computational models of decision making (fig. 1) where external sensory 
evidence (=signal) and internal neural activity (= Gaussian noise) are integrated over time 
towards a decision-threshold which, crossed, leads to the motor response. In the case 
of spontaneous self-initiated movement the sensory evidence is absent or weak and 
replaced by internal noise.
Definitions
History (1): discovery of the 
Beireitschaftpotential ~60’s 
In 1965 Kornhuber & Deecke report the discovery of slowly increasing surface-
negative brain potentials (fig.2) accompanying voluntary movements of the limbs. 
These are called Readiness Potentials and considered the ‘electrophysiological sign 
of planning, preparation, and initiation of volitional acts’ (Kornhuber & Deecke 1990).  
 
In an experimental context dominated by conditional reflex studies on sensory-
evoked potentials (cfr. the ‘expectancy wave' or CNV, discovered 1 year before by 
Walter et al. 1964), this is the first experimental evidence that ‘the willingness to act’ 
is independent of preceding sensory stimulation. 

Somehow, the name itself suggests the implicit idea that this buildup of activity is 

presumed to reflect a preparatory process that is causally responsible for the 
decision of producing a movement.

Paradigm: participants were instructed to execute repetitive hand/foot movements by 
pressing a button for 100-500 times in irregular intervals with pauses of at least 15 s. 

History (2): the ‘Libet paradox’ 
~80’s 
In 1983 Libet introduces a variable to the classical Rp paradigm: the ‘time of 
conscious intention to act’ (called reportable time or Wt) is studied in relation to the 
onset of cerebral activity that precedes ‘freely voluntary, fully endogenous motor act’. 

Paradigm (fig.3): participants were asked to make a spontaneous movement (abrupt 
flexion of finger or wrist) after a complete rotation of a monitoring clock at any time 
when they felt the ‘urge’ to move, without preplanning when to act and to report after 
the recalled clock-position coinciding with the moment of subjective awareness of 
‘wanting’ or intending to act (W). Subjects were also required to report the time of 
awareness of actually moving (M) and the time of awareness of a tactile sensation (S) 
delivered on the back of their hand at irregular unknown times. 

The striking result was that the onset of the RP was shown to precede the reported 
time of conscious intention to act by 300-up to 800ms. This finding had important 
philosophical consequences by leading the prevalent (dualist) view that the brain 
unconsciously initiates decision processes that only at the end come to 
consciousness. In Libet’s words: “the brain ‘decides’ to initiate or, at least, to prepare 
to initiate the act before there is any reportable subjective awareness that such a 
decision has taken place” 

On the nature of the RP ~70’s-2000’s 
Many other studies replicated the RP paradigm showing both in normal and pathological condition factors that can 
influence its magnitude and time course [for a review Di Russo et al. 2016, Shibasaki & Hallett 2006,].

Two main functional components of the RP are found (fig.4), the Early BP and the Late BP which originate from 
different cortical sources (pre-SMA/SMA, M1) [ see Shibasaki & Hallett 2006]

Studies on non human animals, vertebrates and invertebrates (monkey, rat, crayfish) show  the universality of this 
brain signal [cfr. the ‘readiness discharge’ in Kagaya & Takata 2011, 2010].

 
 
 
Conscious intention & free will ~ 80’s-2000’s 
Debate: the psychologist William Banks (2006) wrote that “free will seems pointless if it is not conscious free will. We are 
not interested in unconscious freedom of the will, if there is such a thing”[from Mele A.R. 2015]. 

Critiques on Libet’s methodology (reliability of participants’ subjective report) but main results replicated (e.g. Fried et al. 
2011, Haggard & Eimer 1999).

Controversy on whether the RP reflects specific or non-specific premotor processes : lateralised readiness potential 
(LRP) as a better indicator of motor preparation. Cfr. Alexander et al. 2016.

 
Schurger 2012: noise integration & paradigm shift
Conclusions
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Fried et al. 2011: a study in between 2 paradigms
Integration-to-bound models for 
spontaneous action init iat ion 
studies ~ 2010’s
 
Subjects are tested in a variation of the Libet task, the ‘Libetus Interruptus task’, where 
while performing spontaneous action initiations they can be unexpectedly interrupted by 
random auditory clicks (an imperative to act) and be asked to anticipate their 
movements.  
 
The leaky stochastic accumulator model predicts that earlier responses might 
correspond to moments in which spontaneous brain activity is closer to the decision 
threshold and that an imperative to act can shift premotor activity closer to 
threshold.  
 
The gradual exponential-looking increase in neuronal activity can be obtained through 
the average of stochastic subthreshold fluctuations in brain activity time locked to 
movement onset (fig. A).  
Thus, the buildup of activity cannot be ‘caused’ by the neural decision to move. 
 
The Libet paradigm is replicated with single unit recording in the human 
brain (fig.5). Evidence that preconscious activity of 256 SMA neurons 
not only precedes volition (W reports) but can also predict with >80% 
of accuracy volition already 700 ms before subjects’ awareness. 
Implementation of a integration-to-fire model (fig.6) that explains the 
emergence of the ‘feeling of will’ as the integration of firing rate crosses 
a threshold.  
 
The buildup of activity as the consequence of a neural decision to 
move? 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The convergence of empirical studies and computational modelling has become 
an established trend in many neuroscience domains of research. In particular, in 
the field of volition the study of spontaneous action initiation benefits from the 
novel introduction of bounded integrator models, traditionally dominant in 
decision making.  
 
After Schurger et al. 2012 another important experimental study conducted on 
rats by Murakami et al. 2014 has strengthened the evidences supporting the 
explanatory power of this class of models for spontaneous self-initiated 
movements. 
Rats are tested in a waiting task where a different amount of reward is 
proportionally delivered as a function of how much the rat waits. Giving up trials 
(the ones where rats abort waiting) are considered as spontaneous actions. An 
integrator-model rating activity of neurons -recorded in rat M2 during 
spontaneous giving up trials- is accumulated towards the threshold and will only 
be decisive for the action initiation when the threshold is crossed (fig. 9). The 
ramping activity of this population of neurons resembles the integrated evidence 
in lateral intra-parietal area.
Van Vugt et al. 2014 show how the dynamic of a decision threshold crossing can 
be reflected also by the lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs). Using a Drift-
Diffusion Model they predict and find a correlation between the amplitude and 
shape of the early part of the LRP and the rate of evidence accumulation of 
participants performing a motion discrimination task (fig. 16, 17).  
 
 
A recently published study by Khalighinejad et al. 2017 re-adapts the leaky 
stochastic decision model to account for trial-to-trial variability of participants’ RP, 
predicted to progressively decrease before self-initiated actions in a skipping 
response paradigm. The new model validates the main findings by Schurger et 
al. 2012 by showing a substantial difference in the integration of internal noise in 
the self-initiated vs externally-triggered conditions with the additional assumption 
of noise reduction.
Perceptual-decision paradigms for 
SVM studies ~ 2010’s
Movement onset
RP onset
[Fig. 1, adapted from Haggard in Mele 2015]
[Fig. 2, adapted from Kornhuber & Deecke 2016]
[Fig.4, adapted from Haggard 2008]
[Fig. 9-12 adapted from Schurger et al. 2012]
[Fig.5-8 adapted from Fried et al. 2011]
[Fig. 14, schematic adapted from Rigato et al. 2015][Fig. 13, 15, adapted from Murakami et al. 2014]
[Fig. 16-17 adapted from Van 
Vugt et al. 2014]
2 interpretations of the RP ~ 2010’s 
*Gluth et al. 2013 also conduct a study on RP & LRP adopting an accumulator model, but 
since their study is purely based on a decision making task it was not examined here.
[Fig. 18-19 adapted from 
Khalighinejad et al. 2017]
The introduction of computational model in the study of spontaneous action initiation has 
been accompanied by another very recent change in the experimental paradigms in the 
domain of volition. As extensively discussed by Khalighinejad et al. 2017, in traditional 
readiness potential paradigms -such as the Libet task- the experimenter asks participants to 
‘act freely’, i.e. to initiate a movement whenever s/he feels like/the urge to move. This top-
down instruction of ‘being spontaneous’ is spurious and paradoxical. 
 
Novel studies then have adopted ‘reward-guided perceptual decision making’ paradigms 
(and in particular inter-temporal choice tasks) as more ecological candidates to trigger 
endogenous actions. 

Murakami et al. 2014 and Khalighinejad et al. 2017 implemented tasks where the motor 
response (‘skip response’ or ‘giving up waiting’) is elicited in a randomly long foreperiod thus 
resembling the transition between inaction-action present in animal foraging behaviour.  
[Fig.3, schematic of RP]
We tried to provide an historical account of the main studies in the field of self-initiation and 
volition, with a central focus on the discovery and the study of the Readiness Potential. In 
particular we propose two main parallel directions of the research, in the footsteps of the work 
by Kornhuber & Deck (1965) and Libet et al. (1983): one investigating more closely the nature of 
this electrophysiological signal and another one intermingling with the studies on consciousness. 
We then highlight how a radically innovative interpretation of the RP is marking a change in 
paradigm between the classical studies and the recent approaches, not only from the 
theoretical point of view but also from the methodological one with the introduction of 
bounded-integration models and choice tasks  from decision making studies.
